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Abstract11
1 Device-to-Device (D2D) communication is expected to be a key feature sup-
ported by 5G networks, especially due to the proliferation of Mobile Edge
Computing (MEC), which has a prominent role in reducing network stress
by shifting computational tasks from the Internet to the mobile edge. Apart
from being part of MEC, D2D can extend cellular coverage allowing users to
communicate directly when telecommunication infrastructure is highly con-
gested or absent. This significant departure from the typical cellular paradigm
imposes the need for decentralised network routing protocols. Moreover, en-
hanced capabilities of mobile devices and D2D networking will likely result in
proliferation of new malware types and epidemics. Although the literature is
rich in terms of D2D routing protocols that enhance quality-of-service and en-
ergy consumption, they provide only basic security support, e.g., in the form
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of encryption. Routing decisions can, however, contribute to collaborative de-
tection of mobile malware by leveraging different kinds of anti-malware soft-
ware installed on mobile devices. Benefiting from the cooperative nature of
D2D communications, devices can rely on each other’s contributions to detect
malware. The impact of our work is geared towards having more malware-
free D2D networks. To achieve this, we designed and implemented a novel
routing protocol for D2D communications that optimises routing decisions
for explicitly improving malware detection. The protocol identifies optimal
network paths, in terms of malware mitigation and energy spent for malware
detection, based on a game theoretic model. Diverse capabilities of network
devices running different types of anti-malware software and their potential
for inspecting messages relayed towards an intended destination device are
leveraged using game theoretic tools. An optimality analysis of both Nash
and Stackelberg security games is undertaken, including both zero and non-
zero sum variants, and the Defender’s equilibrium strategies. By undertaking
network simulations, theoretical results obtained are illustrated through ran-
domly generated network scenarios showing how our protocol outperforms
conventional routing protocols, in terms of expected payoff, which consists
of: security damage inflicted by malware and malware detection cost.
Keywords: Device-to-Device (D2D) communications, iRouting protocol,12
Malware detection games, Game theory.13
1. Introduction14
Demand for anytime-anywhere wireless broadband connectivity and in-15
creasingly stringent Quality of Service (QoS) requirements pose new research16
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challenges. As mobile devices are capable of communicating in both cellular17
(e.g. 4G) and unlicensed (e.g. IEEE 802.11) spectrum, the Device-to-Device18
(D2D) networking paradigm has the potential to bring several immediate19
gains. Networking based on D2D communication [1, 2, 3, 4, 5] not only fa-20
cilitates wireless and mobile peer-to-peer services, but also provides energy21
efficient communications, locally oﬄoading computation, oﬄoading connec-22
tivity, and high throughput. The most emerging feature of D2D is the es-23
tablishment and use of multi-hop paths to enable communications among24
non-neighbouring devices. In multi-hop D2D communications, data are de-25
livered from a source to a destination via intermediate (i.e. relaying) devices,26
independently of operators’ networks.27
1.1. Motivation28
To motivate the D2D communication paradigm, we emphasise the need29
for localised applications. These run in a collaborative manner by groups of30
devices at a location where telecommunications infrastructures: (i) are not31
present at all, e.g. underground stations, airplanes, cruise ships, parts of a32
motorway, and mountains; (ii) have collapsed due to physical damage to the33
base stations or insufficient available power, e.g. areas affected by a disaster34
such as earthquake; or (iii) are over congested due to an extremely crowded35
network, e.g. for events in stadiums, and public celebrations. Furthermore,36
relay by device can be leveraged for commercial purposes such as advertise-37
ments and voucher distributions for instance in large shopping centres. This38
is considered a more efficient way of promoting businesses than other tradi-39
tional methods such as email broadcasting and SMS messaging due to the40
immediate identification of the clients in a surrounding area. Home automa-41
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tion and building security are another two areas that multi-hop data delivery42
using D2D communications is likely to overtake our daily life in the near fu-43
ture while multi-hop D2D could be also leveraged towards the provision of44
anonymity against cellular operators [6].45
A key question related to multi-hop D2D networks is, which route should46
the originator of some data choose to send it to an intended destination?. This47
has been exhaustively investigated in the literature of wireless and mobile ad48
hoc routing with well-known protocol to be among others AODV [7], DSR49
[8], and OLSR [9]. A thorough survey of standardisation efforts in this field50
has been published by Ramrekha et al. [10].51
Due to the myriad number of areas D2D communications are applicable52
to, devices are likely to be an ideal target for attackers who aim to infect53
devices with malware. Authors in [11] point out that malware in current54
smartphones and tablets have recently rocketed and established its pres-55
ence through advanced techniques that bypass security mechanisms of de-56
vices. Malware can spread, for instance, through a Multimedia Messaging57
System (MMS) with infected attachments, or an infected message received58
via Bluetooth aiming at stealing users’ personal data or credit stored in the59
device. An example of a well-known worm that propagates through Bluetooth60
was Cabir, which consists of a message containing an application file called61
caribe.sis. Apart from malware infection, Khuzani et al. [12] have inves-62
tigated outbreaks of malware (i.e. malware epidemics) mainly by adopting63
the notion of D2D communication. Finally, social engineering attacks against64
mobile phones is one of the most serious threats, as presented in a relevant65
survey here [13]. For thorough surveys on mobile malware one may refer to66
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[11, 14].67
1.2. Innovation68
In a nutshell,this paper presents a novel routing protocol, for D2D com-69
munications, that supports malware detection in an optimal way by using70
non-cooperative game theoretic tools, which have been extensively used in71
the security literature (e.g. [15]) and in D2D routing (e.g. [16]). Game the-72
ory has also been used for other than routing purposes [17], [18, 19] in D2D73
networks. In this paper we only focus on security games and we tackle a74
decision-making routing challenge, in D2D networks, in presence of an ad-75
versary who injects malware into the network, after she has compromised a76
gateway that connects the D2D network with the cloud. This assumption is77
fairly realistic given the vast power attackers have in their hands these days78
to successfully exploit vulnerabilities of modern gateways. Our underlying79
network has been inspired by the Mobile Edge Computing (MEC) (also refer80
to as Fog Computing) paradigm as a step towards addressing security within81
the realm of an increasingly important area of 5G.82
Our protocol, called iRouting (abbreviating “intelligent Routing”), is de-83
signed upon the theoretical analysis of a simple yet illuminating two-player84
security game between the Defender, which abstracts a D2D network, and85
the Attacker, which abstracts any adversarial entity that wishes to inject86
malware into the D2D network. We have proven that the Defender’s equilib-87
rium strategies leave the network better off, in terms of expected payoff, which88
is a combination of security damage and malware detection cost (i.e. cycles89
process units). Note that iRouting can work on top of underlying physical90
and MAC layer protocols [20, 21].91
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It is worth noting that this paper does not tackle secure routing issues in92
traditional ways. For a survey of secure routing protocols for wireless ad hoc93
networks, see [22, 23]. Such protocols mainly aim at enabling confidentiality,94
and integrity of the communicated data and they do not consider underlying95
collaborative malware detection.96
1.3. Progress beyond relevant work97
This paper extends, in a significant manner, the results initially presented98
in [24]. The exact differences are summarized below.99
• [24] assumes a pure device-to-device network while in this paper the100
device-to-device network has been enriched with a part of mobile edge101
computing. The network devices request services from the MEC server102
and multi-hopping enables communication between the MEC server103
and the different devices to overcome proximity issues due to the lat-104
ter being outside the transmission range of the server. In this paper,105
the security challenge is how to safely utilise MEC services where a106
cluster-head (i.e. MEC server) might be compromised by an adver-107
sary. Although this does not introduce any new challenge in terms of108
malware detection and routing, it is an assumption that places the idea109
of the paper within mobile edge computing and 5G architectures.110
• This paper assumes different mobile operating systems and these can111
be infected with different types of malware as opposed to [24], which112
goes as far as considering just a set of malicious messages that are sent113
from the attacker’s device to infect the legitimate devices. This also114
has the effect of defining, in this paper, the Malware Detection Game115
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whereas in [24], the defined game is called Secure Message Delivery116
Game.117
• In [24], a confusion matrix is defined to determine how the different118
devices of the network can detect malicious messages. In this paper119
here we take a more realistic, in the terms of cyber security, approach120
where for each device there is a probability to be compromised by121
malware. Therefore, each route has, in turn, a penetration level, which122
is the probability the route to be compromised due to one or more123
devices on it being vulnerable.124
• In [24], the details about the interdependencies of malicious message125
detectors is not discussed, while in our paper here we explicitly say126
that each control detects different signs of malware and no interdepen-127
dencies, in terms of detection capabilities, are assumed, i.e. we have128
assumed that an anti-malware control is the minimal piece of software129
that detects certain malicious signs.130
• In [24], the Attacker is not assumed to monitor the network before131
launching a malware attack (no reconnaissance) while in our paper132
here the Attacker surveils the network before injecting malware giving133
us a Stackelberg game to study.134
• In [24], only Nash Equilibria (NE) and maximin strategies have been135
studied. On the other hand, our paper here derives Strong Stackelberg136
Equilibria (SSE) and shows the relationship among three of them; SSE,137
NE and maximin. Not only that, but this paper exhibits much larger138
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depth of mathematical analysis referring also to best responses of play-139
ers. Finally, it proves the equality of strategies of different games, such140
zero-sum and non-zero sum across all strategic types (Nash, Stackel-141
berg, maximin).142
• Although Panaousis et al. [24] has investigated both zero sum and143
non-zero sum games, where in the latter the utility of the Attacker is144
a positive affine transformation (PAT) of the defender’s utility, in this145
paper we go beyond that. We show the equality of the different strate-146
gies holds in a more generic (i.e. than the PAT case) payoff structure147
where the Attackers utility is a strictly positive scaling of the Defender’s148
utility.149
• All simulations in [24] were numeric; as well as they do not compare150
the performance of the proposed routing protocol with other device-to-151
device routing protocols. For the purposes of our paper here we have152
undertaking a network simulation to compare the proposed protocol153
with legacy routing protocols using the OMNeT++ network simula-154
tor. In this way we have simulated physical and link-layer network155
characteristics.156
• In our paper here, we have considered, in our simulations, the efficacies157
of some of the most-recent real-world anti-malware controls against158
real-world malware types as opposed to the purely numeric assignment159
to the different variables.160
• In our simulations here, we have included a new Attacker type, called161
Weighted, which allows the adversary to distribute her resources pro-162
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portionally, over the different routes, aiming at the highest expected163
damage. This type of Attacker was not simulated in [24].164
1.4. Main assumptions165
Our analysis assumes that each device has some malware detection ca-166
pabilities (e.g. anti-malware software). Therefore, a device is able to detect167
malicious application-level events. In other words, each device has its own168
detection rate which contributes towards the overall detection rate of the169
routes that this device is part of. In order to increase malware detection, the170
route with the highest detection capabilities must be selected to relay the171
message to the destination.172
However, due to the different malware types available to attackers, these173
days, such a decision is not trivial. One could argue that if we know the174
probability of a malware type to be chosen, we can develop a proportional175
routing strategy, which will distribute security risks across the different routes176
by choosing routes in a proportional, to their malware detection capabilities,177
manner. Since this knowledge can not be taken for granted in addition to the178
volatile nature of such statistics, in this paper we use game theory to optimise179
routing decisions to support malware detection in D2D networks, regardless180
of the probability of the different malware to be used by the Attacker.181
1.5. Outline182
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: In Section 2, we183
review related work with more emphasis to be given in papers at the inter-184
section of game theory, security, and routing for wireless ad hoc networks185
(i.e. prominent example of D2D networking). In Section 3, we present the186
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system and game models, while in Section 4, we devise game solutions. In187
Section 5, we undertake optimality analysis which leads to a list of theo-188
retic contributions. Section 6 describes, in detail, the iRouting protocol, and189
in Section 7, we compare iRouting against other routing protocols. Finally,190
Section 8 provides concluding remarks and points towards future research.191
2. Related work192
In this section, we briefly review the state-of-the-art, in chronological or-193
der, in terms of game theoretic approaches at the intersection of three fields:194
security, routing, and device-to-device networks. Another set of game theo-195
retic works that focus on optimising intrusion detection strategies per se than196
adjusting routing decisions to optimally support intrusion detection, consist197
of papers such as [25], [26], [27], [27], [28], [29], [30], and [31]. Our work is198
complementary to this literature as it optimises end-to-end path selections, in199
terms of malware detection efficacy and computational effort.200
Looking more into decision regarding packet forwarding by using game201
theoretic tools and without incentive mechanisms in place, Felegyhazi et202
al. [32] have studied the Nash equilibria of packet forwarding strategies with203
tit-for-tat punishment strategy in an iterative game. In each stage (i.e. time204
slot) of the game, each device selects its cooperation level based on the205
normalised throughput it experienced in the previous stage. As opposed to206
iRouting, the authors do not propose a new end-to-end routing protocol;207
instead they consider a shortest path algorithm. Also, they assume the exis-208
tence of internal malicious or selfish nodes in contrast to our work here, which209
models an adversary outside of the D2D cluster, who aims to infect legitimate210
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devices with malware.211
In a more security-oriented vein, Yu et al. [33] have used game theory212
to study the dynamic interactions, in mobile ad hoc (device-to-device) net-213
works, between “good” nodes, which initially believe that all other nodes214
are not malicious, and “adversaries”, which are aware of which nodes are215
good. They propose secure routing and packet forwarding games that consist216
of 3 stages: route participation; route selection; and packet forwarding. In the217
first stage, a node decides whether to be part of route or not; in the second218
phase, a node who wishes to send a packet to a destination, after it discovers a219
valid route (called when all nodes agree to be part of it), it either uses the dis-220
covered route or not; and, finally, in the third phase, each relay node decides221
to forward or not an incoming packet. They have derived optimal defence222
strategies and studied the maximum potential damage, which incurs when223
attackers find a route with maximum number of hops and they inject mali-224
cious traffic into it. The same authors also combined this game with a secure225
routing game but without considering noise and imperfect monitoring. Yu et226
al. [34] extended [33] and proposed a secure cooperation game under noise227
and imperfect monitoring. Likewise, Yu and Liu tackled the same challenge228
and presented a richer set of performance evaluation results in [35]. The above229
publications do not tackle the same challenge with iRouting, as they do not230
investigate the selection of a route among an available set of routes to deliver231
packets from a source to a destination232
Finally, in [36], Panaousis and Politis present a routing protocol that re-233
spects the energy spent by intrusion detection on each route and therefore234
prolonging network lifetime. This paper takes a simple approach, according235
11
to which the attacker either attacks or not a route, and the Defender, like-236
wise, decides whether to allocate resources to defend or not.237
None of the aforesaid protocols consider the propagation of malware238
within the network and none of these works investigates Stackelberg games,239
which basically assume that the Attacker conducts surveillance before decid-240
ing upon her strategy. This is a reasonably realistic assumption when looking241
at the intelligence of cyber hackers and it is a conventional decision in other242
security related fields [37, 38, 39, 40].243
3. System description and game model244
This section presents our underlying system model along with its compo-245
nents. Mobile-edge computing (MEC) is an emerging paradigm that allows246
mobile applications to oﬄoad computationally intensive workloads to a MEC247
server. This introduces a new network architecture concept that provides248
cloud-computing capabilities at the edge of the mobile network. The MEC249
server is likely to be setup by a service provider to ensure that it can provide250
a service environment with very low latency and high-bandwidth.251
3.1. System description252
We use a motivational paradigm demonstrating how D2D communication253
can be combined with a MEC architecture [41], as depicted in Fig. 1. In our254
model, MEC is an intermediate layer between a D2D cluster and the cloud,255
aiming at low-latency service delivery from the latter to the former, and256
it can serve users by using local short-distance high-rate connections. The257
intermediate layer can contain a number of deployed MEC servers aiming to258
handle the localised requests issued by cluster users.259
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We assume that devices within a cluster can communicate in a D2D260
manner: directly or by using multi-hop routes. The cluster is formed based261
on discovery protocols that run in each device. These allow to sense the262
environment and create a list of one-hop neighbours in order to be able to263
communicate should any request to forward data or a direct request be sent.264
We also assume no cellular infrastructure within the cluster, which means265
that devices can only communicate in a device-to-device fashion.266
It is envisaged that such scenarios will be very common in 5G ecosys-267
tems where heterogeneous wireless technologies (e.g. NB-LTE, WiFi, ZigBee,268
Bluetooth) will facilitate D2D communication [3]. For example, a device that269
seeks some data, can request this from other devices in its cluster, and if the270
Request cannot be served the MEC servers must be contacted to assist271
with the discovery of this data.272
The idea here is that a MEC server is dedicated to provide predefined273
service applications to cluster users without the need to communicate with274
the cloud so that it accelerates responses while “pushing” the cloud away of275
the user. We assume that each D2D cluster has a cluster-head [42], which is a276
device that communicates with the MEC servers. The main functionalities of277
a cluster-head are (i) to forward the Request of a device to the MEC servers,278
and (ii) upon its response, to transmit the Reply back to the requestor. In279
this work, the cluster-head can be any device of the cluster. The MEC280
server is expected to talk to both the cloud servers and the cluster-head to281
handle functionalities such as device identifier allocation, call establishment,282
UE capability tracking, service support, and mobility tracking. Note that283
the election of the cluster-head is not investigated in this paper and also this284
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paper is not concerned about deciding the nature of the cluster-head.285
3.2. Adversarial model286
As any open wireless environment, akin to one described in this paper,287
can be a target of adversaries. More specifically, in this paper, we assume the288
existence of a malicious device, called the Attacker, that can launch a Man-289
In-the-Middle (MITM) attack by hijacking the link between the cluster-head290
and MEC servers. Our analysis adopts the Dolev-Yao model [43]. Accord-291
ing to this, the D2D network, along with its established connection with292
the MEC servers, is represented as a set of abstract entities that exchange293
messages. Yet, the adversary is capable of overhearing, intercepting, and294
synthesising any message and she is only limited by the constraints of the295
deployed cryptographic methods. We enrich this adversarial model by con-296
sidering “compromised MEC servers”. This is to say that the adversary per297
se could be inside a legitimate MEC server interacting with the cluster-head298
by using valid credentials and having privileged access to MEC servers. In299
this way, the adversary can inject a fake Reply, crafted with malware, and300
send it back to the data requestor aiming at infecting her device.301
3.3. Malware detection302
In this adversarial environment, we envisage the use of anti-malware con-303
trols running in each device. These can be responsible for scanning network304
traffic for patterns to detect known malicious attempts. Each device may even305
respond to newly detected attack methods (anomaly-based detection). Upon306
detection, devices can block messages that are likely to consist of insecure307
content preventing, in this way, the spread of malware to other devices within308
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Figure 1: Investigated system model, where a device requests data, that the cluster devices
do not possess, from the MEC server. The adversary has successfully launched a MITM
attack controlling the communication between cluster-head and MEC server.
their cluster. This assumption can be seen as an advanced application of the309
next-generation firewalls to mobile devices. Although in this paper we as-310
sume that any detected malice is blocked by the device that has successfully311
undertaken the inspection, our work can be extended to support collabora-312
tive (e.g. reputation-based) filtering towards blocking messages that end up313
having a bad reputation. Such an approach can take advantage of learning314
techniques and its investigation will be part of our future work.315
3.4. Formulation316
Let us assume a cluster of N devices. We denote by C its cluster-head,317
and by Rqs the requestor of some data. Henceforth we will refer to this data318
as D. If the latter can not be found within the cluster itself, Rqs must seek D319
hosted by the MEC servers of its cluster. Thus, C receives a Request from320
Rqs, and it then queries the MEC server.321
When C receives back a Reply from the MEC server and Rqs is not within322
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its transmission range, a route r must be established to deliver D from C to323
Rqs. Therefore, there is a need for the devices to relay D towards Rqs, but324
before that, C must decide upon r. We assume R routes available between325
C and Rqs, we denote by rj ∈ [R], the jth route, and the set of devices326
that constitute rj are expressed by Sj. Note that we use the notation [Ξ] to327
represent the set of Ξ elements.328
Although the route selection can be entirely taken based on quality-of-329
service parameters optimising network delay and jitter, the presence of an330
Attacker, let it be A, introduces uncertainty with regards to the malice of the331
data conveyed toward Rqs. For instance, if A controls the link C ⇐⇒ MEC,332
then D can be anything including malware. If this is the case, Rqs, which333
trusts C, is very likely to be infected by this malware. In this paper, the334
infection risk depends on the likelihood the malware to be collaboratively335
detected prior to the data being used by Rqs. This detection relies on devices336
that forward packets to Rqs, as these are also inspecting the incoming and337
outgoing network traffic.338
Let us consider Λ different mobile operating systems, and Mλ different339
malware available to the Attacker to infect devices that run a mobile operat-340
ing system λ ∈ [Λ]. Each device may run one or more anti-malware controls341
and for each λ we assume AMλ anti-malware controls, which can mitigate342
malware that targets devices running λ.343
Let us also assume S devices and a device si ∈ [S], which runs λ,
might have available a combination of anti-malware controls given by the set
[AM iλ] ⊆ [AMλ]. We use the characteristic function2 1[AM iλ] : [AMλ]→ {0, 1}
2this is a function defined on a set X that indicates membership of an element in a
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defined as follows:
1[AMλ](az) :=
1, if az ∈ [AMλ],0, if az /∈ [AMλ]. (1)
to express whether a control az is installed in si or not.344
We express by d(ml, az) ∈ [0, 1) the effectiveness of anti-malware control
az in mitigating ml ∈ [Mλ]. As a device can run one or more anti-malware
controls, and each control az has 1− d(ml, az) probability of failing to detect
ml, the probability of si failing to detect ml equals
p(si,ml) :=
∏
az∈[AMλ]:1[AMλ](az)=1
[1− d(ml, az)] . (2)
Note that each control detects different signs of malware and no interdepen-345
dencies, in terms of detection capabilities, are assumed in this paper. To put346
it differently, we have assumed that an anti-malware control is the minimal347
piece of software that detects certain malicious signs.348
We define as349
p(si) := [p(si,ml)]ml∈[Mλ] ∈ [0, 1]Mλ . (3)
the vector of failing detection probabilities, which captures the effectiveness350
of si on detecting malware of the set [Mλ]. One challenge here is to be able351
to derive these probabilities in practice. This, for instance, can be done by352
subset X ′ of X, having the value 1 for all elements of X ′ and the value 0 for all elements
of X not in X ′.
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undertaking thorough penetration tests (i.e. ethical hacking) to assess the353
efficacy of each anti-malware control. These tests can be performed oﬄine for354
individual software components and then their combinations can be deployed355
on the devices. As a result of this we can derive the probability of ml to infect356
Rqs, when C uses the jth route for data delivery, as follows:357
p(rj,ml) :=
∏
si∈Sj
p(si,ml). (4)
Thus, we define as p(rj) := [p(rj,ml)]ml∈[M ] the vector of probabilities rj to358
be infected by the different malware. For more convenience, Table 1 summa-359
rizes the notation used in this paper.360
3.5. Game model361
Now that we have defined our system model by describing its compo-362
nents and their relationship, in the rest of this section, we use game theory363
to investigate the optimal strategic routing decisions of C, the Defender, and364
the Attacker who aims to infect one of the cluster devices with mobile mal-365
ware. The Attacker’s objective is to succeed an attack against Rqs and the366
Defender must select a route to deliver the Reply to Rqs.367
We define the Malware Detection Game (MDG) between Defender and368
Attacker, as an one-shot, bimatrix game of complete information played for369
each requestor that seek some data. The set of pure strategies of the Defender370
consists of all possible routes, rj ∈ [R], from C to Rqs. On the other hand, the371
pure strategies of the Attacker are the different malware ml ∈ [M ] that can be372
injected into the D2D network in the form of a Reply. Thus, in MDG a pure373
strategy profile is a pair of Defender and Attacker actions, (rj,ml) ∈ [R]×[M ]374
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Table 1: List of Symbols
Symbol Description Symbol Description
[N ] Set of N devices C Cluster-head
Rqs Data requestor D Requested data
[R] Set of routes from C to Rqs rj j-th route
Sj Set of devices on rj A Attacker
[Λ]
Set of mobile operating sys-
tems
λ Operating system
[Mλ]
Set of malware that can infect
λ
[AMλ]
Set of anti-malware controls
for λ
[S] Set of devices si i-th device
ml l-th malware d(ml, az)
Effectiveness az in mitigating
ml
p(si,ml)
Probability of si failing to de-
tect ml
p(si)
Vector of “failing-to-detect”
probabilities of si for different
malware
p(rj ,ml)
Probability of Rqs to be in-
fected with malware ml when
D is sent over rj
p(rj)
Vector of infection probabil-
ities for rj and all malware
types
[M ] Set of malware ρ Defender’s mixed strategy
µ Attacker’s mixed strategy S(rj ,ml)
Expected security damage on
route rj when relaying ml
c(si) Malware detection cost on si C(rj) Malware detection cost on rj
H(ml) Security loss inflicted by ml L path length
Cj Set of computational malwareinspection costs c(si) in rj Tj
Set of malware inspection ca-
pabilities p(si) in rj
giving a pure strategy space of size R ×M . For the rest of the paper, the375
convention is adopted where the Defender is the row player and the Attacker376
is the column player.377
Each player’s preferences are specified by her payoff function, and we378
define as Ud : (rj,ml)→ R− and Ua : (rj,ml)→ R+ the payoff functions of the379
Defender and Attacker, respectively, when the pure strategy profile (rj,ml)380
is played. According to [44], we define a preference relation %, when ml is381
chosen by the Attacker, by the condition rx % ry, if and only if Ud(rx,ml) ≥382
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Ud(ry,ml). In general, given the set [R] of all available routes from C to383
Rqs, a rational Defender can choose a route (i.e. pure strategy) r∗ that is384
feasible, that is r∗ ∈ [R], and optimal in the sense that r∗ % r, ∀ r ∈385
[R], r 6= r∗; alternatively she solves the problem maxr∈[R] Ud(r, ml), for386
a message ml ∈ [M ]. Likewise, we can define the preference relation for the387
Attacker, where mx % my ⇐⇒ Ua(rj,mx) ≥ Ua(rj,my), for a route rj ∈ [R].388
MDG can be seen as a game per session, where the start of each session389
is signified by the transmission of a new Reply that the cluster-head will390
send to Rqs; it is also realistic to assume that over a time period, there will391
be multiple sessions. To derive optimal strategies for the Defender during the392
repetitions of MDGs, we deploy the notion of mixed strategies. Since players393
act independently, we can enlarge their strategy spaces, so as to allow them394
to base their decisions on the outcome of random events that create uncer-395
tainty to the opponent about individual strategic choices maximising their396
payoffs. Hence, both Defender and Attacker deploy randomised (i.e. mixed)397
strategies. The mixed strategy ρ of the Defender is a probability distribution398
over the different routes (i.e. pure strategies) from C to Rqs, where ρ(rj) is399
the probability of delivering a Reply via rj under mixed strategy ρ. We400
refer to a mixed strategy of the Defender as a Randomised Delivery Plan401
(RDP). For the finite nonempty set [R], let Π[R] represent the set of all prob-402
ability distributions over it, i.e.403
Π[R] := {ρ ∈ R+R|
∑
rj∈[R]
ρ(rj) = 1}. (5)
Therefore a member of Π[R] is a mixed strategy of the Defender.404
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Likewise, the Attacker’s mixed strategy is a probability distribution over405
the different available malware. This is denoted by µ, where µ(ml) is the406
probability of choosing ml under mixed strategy µ. We refer to a mixed407
strategy of the Attacker as the Malware Plan (MP). Similarly with (5), we408
express by Π[M ] the set of all probability distributions over the set of all409
Attacker’s pure strategies given by [M ]. Thus, a member of Π[M ] is as a410
mixed strategy of the Attacker. From the above, the set of mixed strategy411
profiles of MDG is the Cartesian product of the individual mixed strategy412
sets, Π[R] × Π[M ].413
Definition 1. The support of RDP ρ is the set of routes {rj|ρ(rj) > 0}, and414
it is denoted by supp(ρ).415
Definition 2. The support of MP µ is the set of malware {ml|µ(ml) >416
0}, and it is denoted by supp(µ).417
The above definitions state that the subset of routes (resp. malware) that418
are assigned positive probability by the mixed strategy ρ (resp. µ) is called419
the support of ρ (resp. µ). Note that a pure strategy is a special case of a420
mixed strategy, in which the support is a single action.421
Now that we have defined the mixed strategies of the players, we can422
define MDG as the finite strategic game Γ = 〈(Defender, Attacker), Π[R] ×423
Π[M ], (Ud, Ua)〉. For a given mixed strategy profile (ρ,µ) ∈ Π[R] ×Π[M ], we424
denote by Ud(ρ,µ), and Ua(ρ,µ) the expected payoff values of the Defender425
and Attacker, where the expectation is due to the independent randomisa-426
tions according to mixed strategies ρ, and µ.427
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Formally428
Ud(ρ,µ) :=
∑
rj∈[R]
∑
ml∈[M ]
Ud(rj,ml)ρ(rj)µ(ml). (6)
and similarly429
Ua(ρ,µ) :=
∑
rj∈[R]
∑
ml∈[M ]
Ua(rj,ml)ρ(rj)µ(ml). (7)
By using the preference relation we can say that, for an Attacker’s mixed430
strategy µ, the Defender prefers to follow the RDP ρ as opposed to ρ′431
(i.e. ρ % ρ′), if and only if Ud(ρ,µ) ≥ Ud(ρ′,µ).432
Definition 3. The Defender’s (resp. Attacker’s) best response to the mixed433
strategy µ (resp. ρ) of the Attacker (resp. Defender) is a RDP ρBR ∈ Π[R]434
(resp. µBR ∈ Π[M ]) such that Ud(ρBR,µ) ≥ Ud(ρ,µ), ∀ ρ ∈ Π[R] (resp. Ua(ρ,µBR) ≥435
Ud(ρ,µ), ∀ µ ∈ Π[M ]).436
It is noteworthy to mention that the game theoretic solutions that we will437
propose, in the next section, involve randomisation. For instance, in a mixed438
equilibrium, each player’s randomisation leaves the other indifferent across439
her randomisation support. These choices can be deliberately randomised or440
be taken by software agents that run in mobile devices (i.e. cluster-heads or441
adversaries). However these are not the only equilibria interpretations. For442
instance, the probabilities over the pure actions (i.e. route or malware pure443
selections) can represent (i) time averages of an “adaptive” player, (ii) a444
vector of fractions of a “population”, where each player type adopts pure445
strategies and, (iii) a “belief” vector that each player has about the other446
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regarding their behaviour.447
4. Game solutions448
Now that we have defined MDG along with its components, in this section449
we concentrate in deriving optimal strategies for the Defender. First, we in-450
vestigate the problem of determining best RDPs and MPs (i.e. mixed strate-451
gies), for the Defender and the Attacker respectively, when both parties are452
rational decision-makers and they play simultaneously. Note that a game453
solution is a prediction of how rational players may take decisions.454
As we have not explicitly defined the strategic type of Attacker, we con-455
sider different types of solutions based on various Attacker behaviours. This456
analysis will allow us to draw robust conclusions regarding the overall opti-457
mal Defender strategy, which will minimise expected damages regardless of458
the Attacker type.459
4.1. Nash mixed strategies460
The most commonly used solution concept in game theory is that of Nash461
Equilibrium (NE). This concept captures a steady state of the play of the462
MDG in which Defender and Attacker hold the correct expectation about463
the other players’ behaviour and they act rationally. In other words, an NE464
dictates optimal responses to each other’s actions, keeping the others’ strate-465
gies fixed, i.e. strategy profiles that are resistant against unilateral deviations466
of players.467
Definition 4. In any Malware Detection Game (MDG), a mixed strategy468
profile (ρNE,µNE) of Γ is a mixed NE if and only if469
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1. ρNE % ρ, ∀ρ ∈ Π[R], when the Attacker chooses µNE, i.e.470
Ud(ρ
NE,µNE) ≥∀ρ∈Π[R] Ud(ρ,µNE); (8)
2. µNE % µ, ∀µ ∈ Π[M ], when the Defender chooses ρNE, i.e.471
Ua(ρ
NE,µNE) ≥∀µ∈Π[M ] Ua(ρNE,µ). (9)
Definition 5. The Nash Delivery Plan (NDP), denoted by ρNE, is the prob-472
ability distribution over the different routes, as determined by the NE of the473
MDG.474
For instance, a NDP (0.7, 0.3) dictates that 70% of the Replys will be475
sent over r1, and 30% over r2. Note that this distribution does not determine476
which Reply is sent over which route, as this decision is probabilistic.477
4.2. Maximin strategies478
We say that the Defender maximinimizes if she chooses an RDP that is479
best for her on the assumption that whatever she does, the Attacker will480
choose an MP to cause the highest possible damage to her.481
Definition 6. A Randomised Delivery Plan ρ† ∈ Π[R] is a maximin strategy482
of the Defender, if and only if483
min
µ∈Π[M ]
Ud(ρ
†,µ) ≥ min
µ∈Π[M ]
Ud(ρ,µ), ∀ρ ∈ Π[R]. (10)
A maximinimiser for the Defender is an RDP that maximises the pay-484
off that the Defender can guarantee. In other words, ρ† guarantees (i.e. “se-485
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cures”) the Defender at least her maximin payoff regardless of µ, as ρ† solves486
the problem maxρ minµ Ud(ρ,µ). That is why ρ
† is also called security strat-487
egy.488
Definition 7. A Malware Plan µ† ∈ Π[M ] is a maximin strategy of the489
Attacker, if and only if490
min
ρ∈Π[R]
Ua(ρ,µ
†) ≥ min
ρ∈Π[R]
Ua(ρ,µ),∀µ ∈ Π[M ]. (11)
4.3. Stackelberg mixed strategies491
A two-player Stackelberg game involves one player (leader) to commit to492
a strategy before the other player (follower) moves. In a Stackelberg model493
the commitment of the leader is absolute, that is the leader cannot back-track494
on her commitment. On the other hand, the follower sees the strategy that495
the leader committed to, before she chooses a strategy.496
In an Stackelberg MDG, the Attacker conducts surveillance before she at-497
tacks and therefore she is aware of the Defender’s RDP. For completeness, we498
consider that this best-response is expressed also in mixed strategies.499
In general, Stackelberg and Nash games do not have the same equilib-500
ria. For instance, let us consider the normal-form MDG in Table 2, where501
the Defender has only two routes (r, r′) available and the Attacker can choose502
between two malware types (m,m′). We see that if this is a Nash game, r503
is a strictly dominant strategy for the Defender, as it gives her a higher504
payoff value than r′. As we have assumed that this is a complete informa-505
tion game, the Attacker knows that r is preferable for the Defender and she506
chooses m, which rewards her with 1 as opposed to m′, which gives payoff507
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Table 2: A toy game example
m m′
r -3,1 -1,0
r′ -4,0 -2,1
value 0. Therefore the NE of the game (in pure strategies) is (r,m).508
If we now consider this game as Stackelberg, the Defender (leader) can509
commit to a strategy before the Attacker (follower) chooses her strategy. If510
the Defender commits to r then the Attacker will play m, but if the Defender511
commits to r′ then the Attacker will choose m′. The second pure strategy512
profile, i.e. (r′,m′) gives higher payoff to the Defender (-2 as opposed to513
(r,m), which gives -3) and therefore the Defender is better-off in the Stack-514
elberg game compared to the Nash game, where her payoff equals -3 < -2.515
Definition 8. A Reply Delivery Plan (RDP) is optimal if it maximises the516
Defender’s payoff given that the Attacker will always play a best-response517
strategy with tie-breaking in favour of the Defender.518
Definition 9. A Malware Plan is a best response if it maximises the At-519
tacker’s payoff, taking the Defender’s Reply Delivery Plan as given.520
A commonly used notion of a solution in Stackelberg games is the Strong521
Stackelberg Equilibrium (SSE), defined in MDG as follows.522
Definition 10. At the Strong Stackelberg Equilibrium of the MDG:523
1. for any ρ ∈ ∆[R], the Attacker plays a best-response µBR(ρ) ∈ ∆[M ]524
that is,525
Ua(ρ,µ
BR(ρ))≥Ua(ρ,µ(ρ)), ∀µ(ρ) 6=µBR(ρ); (12)
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2. for any ρ ∈ ∆[R], the Attacker breaks ties in favour of the Defender, that526
is, when there are multiple best responses to ρ, the Attacker plays the527
best response µSSE(ρ) ∈ ∆[M ] that maximises the Defender’s payoff:528
Ud(ρ,µ
SSE(ρ))≥Ud(ρ,µBR(ρ)),
∀µBR best response to ρ;
(13)
3. the Defender plays a best-response ρSSE ∈ ∆[R], which maximises her529
payoff given that the Attacker’s strategies are given by the first two530
conditions (i.e. the Attacker always plays best response with tie-breaking531
in favour of the Defender [38],[45]):532
Ud(ρ
SSE,µSSE(ρSSE))≥Ud(ρ, µSSE(ρ)), ∀ ρ6=ρSSE. (14)
5. Optimality analysis533
For the purpose of analysis, we consider complete information Nash MDGs,534
according to which both players know the game matrix, which contains the535
utilities of both players for each pure strategy profile. The utility function536
of the Defender is determined by the probability of failing to detect a route537
and the overall performance cost, which is imposed on the devices of the j-th538
route when undertaking malware detection. We denote by c(si) the perfor-539
mance cost imposed on each si ∈ Sj and therefore the overall performance540
cost over a route rj equals
∑
si∈Sj c(si).541
We consider two different MDGs; (i) a zero sum MDG, where the At-542
tacker’s utility is the opposite of the Defender’s utility and (ii) a non-zero543
sum MDG, where the Attacker’s utility is a strictly positive scaling of the544
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Defender’s utility.545
The rationale behind the zero sum game is that when there are clear546
winners (e.g. the Attacker) and losers (e.g. the Defender), and the Defender547
is uncertain about the Attacker type, she considers the worst case scenario,548
which can be formulated by a zero sum game where the Attacker can cause549
her maximum damage. While in most security situations the interests of the550
players are neither in strong conflict nor in complete identity, the zero sum551
game provides important insights into the notion of “optimal play”, which is552
closely related to the minimax theorem [46].553
In the zero sum MDG, Γ0 = 〈{d, a}, [R] × [M ], {Ud,−Ud}〉 (for clarity d554
has been used for the Defender and a for the Attacker), the Attacker’s gain555
is equal to the Defender’s security loss, and vice versa. We define the utility556
of the Defender in Γ0 as557
UΓ0d (rj,ml) := −wH p(rj,ml)H(ml)− wC
∑
si∈Sj
c(si). (15)
The first term of (15) is the expected security loss of the Defender inflicted by558
the Attacker when attempting to infect Rqs with ml, while the second term559
expresses the aggregated message inspection cost imposed on all devices of560
rj, irrespective of the attacking strategy. Note that wH , wC ∈ [0, 1] are impor-561
tance weights, which can facilitate the Defender with setting her preferences562
in terms of security loss, and computational detection cost, accordingly.563
By setting S(rj,ml) = wH p(rj,ml)H(ml), and C(rj) = wC
∑
si∈Sj c(si),564
we have that565
UΓ0d (rj,ml) := −S(rj,ml)− C(rj). (16)
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For a mixed profile (ρ,µ), the utility of the Defender equals566
UΓ0d (ρ,µ)
(6)
=
∑
rj∈[R]
∑
ml∈[M ]
UΓ0d (rj ,ml)ρ(rj)µ(ml)
(16)
=
∑
rj∈[R]
∑
ml∈[M ]
[−S(rj ,ml)− C(rj)]ρ(rj)µ(ml)
= −
∑
rj∈[R]
∑
ml∈[M ]
S(rj ,ml)ρ(rj)µ(ml)
−
∑
rj∈[R]
C(rj)ρ(rj).
(17)
As Γ0 is a zero sum game, the Attacker’s utility is given by U
Γ0
a (ρ,µ) =567
−UΓ0d (ρ,µ). Since the Defender’s equilibrium strategies maximise her utility,568
given that the Attacker maximises her own utility, we will refer to them as569
optimal strategies.570
As Γ0 is a two-person zero sum game with finite number of actions for571
both players, according to Nash [47], it admits at least a NE in mixed strate-572
gies, and saddle-points correspond to Nash equilibria as discussed in [15]573
(p. 42). The following result from [48], establishes the existence of a sad-574
dle (equilibrium) solution in the games we examine and summarizes their575
properties.576
Definition 11 (Saddle point of the MDG). The Γ0 Malware Detection Game577
(MDG) admits a saddle point in mixed strategies, (ρNEΓ0 ,µ
NE
Γ0
), with the prop-578
erty that579
• ρNEΓ0 = arg maxρ∈∆[R] minµ∈∆[M ] UΓ0d (ρ,µ), ∀µ, and580
• µNEΓ0 = arg maxµ∈∆[M ] minρ∈∆[R] UΓ0a (ρ,µ), ∀ρ.581
Then, due to the zero sum nature of the game, the minimax theorem [46]582
holds, i.e. maxρ∈∆[R] minµ∈∆[M ] U
Γ0
d (ρ,µ) = minµ∈∆[M ] maxρ∈∆[R] U
Γ0
d (ρ,µ).583
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The pair of saddle point strategies (ρNEΓ0 ,µ
NE
Γ0
) are at the same time se-584
curity strategies for the players, i.e. they ensure a minimum performance585
regardless of the actions of the other. Furthermore, if the game admits mul-586
tiple saddle points (and strategies), they have the ordered interchangeability587
property, i.e. the player achieves the same performance level independent588
from the other player’s choice of saddle point strategy.589
The minimax theorem [46] states that for zero sum games, NE and mini-590
max solutions coincide. Therefore, ρNEΓ0 = arg minρ∈∆[R] maxµ∈∆[M ] U
Γ0
a (ρ,µ).591
This means that regardless of the strategy the Attacker chooses, the Nash592
Delivery Plan (NDP) is the Defender’s security strategy that guarantees a593
minimum performance.594
We can convert Γ0 into a Linear Programming (LP) problem and make595
use of some of the powerful algorithms available for LP to derive the equi-596
librium. For a given mixed strategy ρ of the Defender, we assume that the597
Attacker can cause maximum damage to Rqs by injecting a message m̂ into598
the cluster network.599
Formally, the Defender seeks to solve the following LP:600
max
ρ∈∆[R]
min
µ∈∆[M ]
UΓ0d (ρ, m̂ )
subject to

UΓ0d (ρ,m1)−minµ∈∆[M ] UΓ0d (ρ, m̂)e ≥ 0
...
UΓ0d (ρ,mM )−minµ∈∆[M ] UΓ0d (ρ, m̂)e ≥ 0
ρe = 1
ρ ≥ 0.
(18)
In this problem, e is a vector of ones of size M .601
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Lemma 1. A mixed strategy profile (ρNE,µNE) ∈ Π[R] × Π[M ] in Γ0, is a602
mixed strategy NE if and only if603
1. every route rj ∈ supp(ρNE) selection is a best response to µNE and,604
2. every malware ml ∈ supp(µNE) selection is a best response to ρNE.605
Proof. First, notice that Ud, as defined in (15), is a linear function in ρ(rj)606
that is, for any two RDPs ρ1 and ρ2 and any number θ ∈ [0, 1] we have607
Ud(θ ρ1 + (1 − θ)µ) = θ Ud(ρ1) + (1 − θ)Ud(ρ2). Then, for the sake of con-608
tradiction, assume there exists a route r′j ∈ supp(ρNE) selection that is not a609
best response to µNE. Due to the linearity of Ud in ρ
NE(rj), the Defender can610
increase her payoff by transferring probability from ρ(r′j) to a route selection611
that is a best response to µNE, creating a new mixed strategy ρ∗ % ρNE. How-612
ever, this contradicts the assumption that ρNE is the strategy of the Defender613
at the NE, as the Defender prefers to deviate from ρNE to gain a higher pay-614
off, by playing ρ∗. The second part of the lemma can be proven in the same615
way.616
Let us now assume a non-zero sum MDG, denoted by Γ, with the same617
strategy spaces with Γ0, in which the Defender’s utility is the same as in618
Γ0, i.e. U
Γ
d (ρ,µ) = U
Γ0
d (ρ,µ) = −S(rj,ml)− C(rj). On the other hand, the619
Attacker’s utility is (strictly positive) scaling of the security loss S(rj,ml) of620
the Defender upon a successful attack. This is to say that the performance621
cost of the Defender is only important to her as the Attacker is only after622
compromising Rqs. Therefore, given a pure strategy profile (rj,ml), the utility623
of the Attacker, in Γ, is defined as:624
UΓa (rj,ml) := ΞS(rj,ml), for Ξ > 0. (19)
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For a mixed profile (ρ,µ) the utility of the Attacker is given by625
UΓa (ρ,µ)
(7)
=
∑
rj∈[R]
∑
ml∈[M ]
UΓa (rj,ml)ρ(rj)µ(ml)
(19)
=
∑
rj∈[R]
∑
ml∈[M ]
ΞS(rj,ml)ρ(rj)µ(ml).
(20)
Hence, due to UΓd (ρ,µ) = U
Γ0
d (ρ,µ), from (17) and (20) we have that626
UΓd (ρ,µ) = −
1
Ξ
UΓa (ρ,µ)−
∑
rj∈[R]
C(rj)ρ(rj)
= − 1
Ξ
UΓa (ρ,µ)− k(ρ),
(21)
where 1
Ξ
> 0, and k(ρ) is an expression that does not depend on µ. That is,627
the best response of the Defender to any given malware plan, also yields the628
utility for the Defender at the worst case scenario.629
Lemma 2. NE strategies of the Defender in Γ are equivalent of the NE630
strategies of the Defender in Γ0. Formally, Ω
NE
Γ = Ω
NE
Γ0
.631
Proof. By definition, a strategy profile (ρNE,µNE) is NE of Γ if and only if:
S(ρNE,µNE) + k(ρNE) ≤ S(ρ,µNE) + k(ρ),∀ρ ∈ ∆[R], (22a)
Ξ · S(ρNE,µNE) ≥ Ξ · S(ρNE,µ), ∀µ ∈ ∆[M ]. (22b)
Here is the observation:632
Ξ · S(ρNE,µNE) ≥ Ξ · S(ρNE,µ), ∀µ ∈ ∆[M ] ⇐⇒
Ξ · [S(ρNE,µNE) + k(ρNE)] ≥
Ξ · [S(ρNE,µ) + k(ρNE)],∀µ ∈ ∆[M ].
(23)
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Since Ξ > 0, the latter condition is satisfied if and only if:633
S(ρNE,µNE) + k(ρNE) ≥ S(ρNE,µ) + k(ρNE),∀µ ∈ ∆[M ]. (24)
In short, (ρNE,µNE) is a NE of Γ, if and only if it satisfies:
S(ρNE,µNE)+k(ρNE)≤S(ρ,µNE)+k(ρ),∀ρ∈∆[R], (25a)
S(ρNE,µNE)+k(ρNE)≥S(ρNE,µ)+k(ρNE),∀µ∈∆[M ]. (25b)
But these are exactly the conditions describing a NE of Γ0. Therefore Ω
NE
Γ =634
ΩNEΓ0 .635
Lemma 3. In Γ, the set of NE and Maximin strategies of the Defender are636
equivalent, i.e. ΩNEΓ = Ω
maximin
Γ .637
Proof. (⇒) Since Γ0 is a two person zero-sum game, we know that the set638
of NE and Maximin strategies of the Defender are the same, i.e. ΩNEΓ0 =639
ΩmaximinΓ0 . Let (ρ
NE,µNE) ∈ ΩNEΓ then based on Lemma 2 we have that640
(ρNE,µNE) ∈ ΩNEΓ0 . Since Γ0 is zero-sum, ρNE ∈ ΩmaximinΓ0 . But the strategy641
spaces and the utility of the Defender are the same in both Γ and Γ0. Hence642
the conditions for a mixed strategy to be a Defender’s Maximin is the same643
in both games. Therefore, ρNE ∈ ΩmaximinΓ , i.e. ΩNEΓ ⊆ ΩmaximinΓ .644
(⇐) The argument goes in the other direction as well: consider ρNE ∈645
ΩmaximinΓ . Since the utility of the Defender and the strategy spaces are the646
same across the two games, for the same strategy ρNE, we have that ρNE ∈647
ΩmaximinΓ0 . Since Γ0 is two-player zero-sum, there exists µ
NE such that (ρNE,µNE) ∈648
ΩNEΓ0 . From Lemma 2, this means (ρ
NE,µNE)Γ ∈ ΩNE. Hence, Maximin strate-649
gies of the Defender are also part of her NE strategies in Γ, i.e. ΩmaximinΓ ⊆650
ΩNEΓ . Putting the two together Ω
NE
Γ = Ω
maximin
Γ .651
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This lemma establishes that the Defender can randomise according to her652
NE and, in expectation, be guaranteed at least the expected utility prescribed653
by the NE, irrespective of the mixed strategy of the Attacker. To put it654
differently, the Defender can play her pessimistic maximin strategy, but she655
does not lose anything in expectation by not playing a NE strategy. It is worth656
stressing that this property only holds for the NE strategy of the Defender657
and not of the Attacker.658
Lemma 4. In Γ, the set of Maximin and SSE strategies of the Defender are659
the same, i.e. ΩmaximinΓ = Ω
SSE
Γ .660
Proof. (⇒) Let ρNE ∈ ΩSSEΓ be a SSE strategy of the Defender. Then by661
definition, ρNE is (i) an optimal strategy of the Defender given that (ii) the662
Attacker is best-responding to it but by (iii) breaking ties in favour of the663
Defender. That is:664
(i) ρNE ∈ arg maxρ∈∆[R] Ud(ρ,µBR(ρ)) where;665
(ii) for any ρ ∈ ∆[R], µBR(ρ) ∈ arg maxµ∈∆[M ] Ua(ρ,µ) and;666
(iii) for any ρ ∈ ∆[R]:667
µBR(ρ) ∈ arg max
µ∈arg maxµ∈∆[M ] Ua(ρ,µ)
Ud(ρ,µ). (26)
Let us examine condition (ii): for any ρ ∈ ∆[R]:668
µBR(ρ) ∈ arg max
µ∈∆[M ]
Ξ · S(ρ,µ) ⇐⇒
µBR(ρ) ∈ arg max
µ∈∆[M ]
Ξ · [S(ρ,µ) + k(ρ)]
µBR(ρ) ∈ arg max
µ∈∆[M ]
S(ρ,µ) + k(ρ).
(27)
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In short, condition (ii) is equivalent to:
(iv) For any ρ ∈ ∆[R],µBR(ρ) ∈ arg min
µ∈∆[M ]
Ud(ρ,µ).
This makes condition (iii) irrelevant. But conditions (i) and (iv) exactly de-669
scribe a Maximin strategy of the Defender. Therefore we have proved that670
ΩSSEΓ ⊆ ΩmaximinΓ . (⇐) The argument can be established identically in reverse671
direction, starting from a Maximin strategy of the Defender. So given con-672
ditions (i) and (iv) we must prove that conditions (ii) and (iii) are true. Let673
ρNE ∈ ΩmaximinΓ be a Maximin strategy of the Defender. Then by definition,674
ρNE is (i) an optimal strategy of the Defender given that (iv) the Attacker is675
minimising Defender’s utility. We see that condition (ii) is true if and only676
if condition (iv) is true. Since the Maximin strategy ρNE makes condition677
(iv) true, it will also make condition (ii). To prove that ρNE is an SSE, we678
also need to prove condition (iii). Let us assume that the condition is not679
true. This means that there is a best-response of the Attacker that does not680
break ties in favour of the Defender. Formally,681
µBR(ρ)/∈arg max
µ∈argmaxµUa(ρ,µ)
Ud(ρ,µ)⇐⇒
µBR(ρ)/∈arg max
µ∈argmaxµUa(ρ,µ)
{−S(ρ,µ)−k(ρ)}⇐⇒
µBR(ρ)/∈arg min
µ∈argmaxµUa(ρ,µ)
{
S(ρ,µ)+k(ρ)
}⇐⇒
µBR(ρ)/∈arg min
µ∈argmaxµUa(ρ,µ)
S(ρ,µ)⇐⇒
µBR(ρ)/∈arg min
µ∈argmaxµUa(ρ,µ)
Ua(ρ,µ),
(28)
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which is leads to a contradiction. Therefore condition (3) holds, and putting682
together all three conditions (1), (2), and (3), we have that ρNE, which is a683
Maximin strategy of the Defender it is also an SSE strategy, i.e. ΩmaximinΓ ⊆684
ΩSSEΓ . Putting the two proofs together we have that Ω
maximin
Γ = Ω
SSE
Γ .685
Theorem 1. In Γ, the set of NE, Maximin and SSE strategies of the De-686
fender are the same, i.e. ΩNEΓ = Ω
maximin
Γ = Ω
SSE
Γ . Besides, all NE are inter-687
changeable, in Γ, and all yield the same utility for the defender.688
Proof. Trivially, from Lemmas 3 and 4 we have that ΩNEΓ = Ω
maximin
Γ =689
ΩSSEΓ . Since Γ0 is a two person zero-sum game, we know that all NE are690
interchangeable [48]. From Lemma 2 the NE of Γ0 are the NE of Γ and691
vice-versa. We also see that the utility of the Defender is the same across692
Γ and Γ0. Therefore the utility of the Defender in all NE of our original693
game is the same, which also implies that all NE of our original game are694
interchangeable.695
The above lemma establishes that the Defender, regardless of whether696
the Attacker conducts surveillance, she plays optimally when she randomises697
according to her NE strategy.698
Theorem 2. Regardless of the type of malware detection game played, i.e.699
1. a zero sum or a non-zero sum malware detection game,700
2. a Nash or a Stackelberg malware detection game,701
the Defender plays optimally by choosing any strategy ρ ∈ ΩNEΓ0 .702
Proof. By combining 2 and 1, we have that ΩNEΓ0 = Ω
NE
Γ = Ω
maximin
Γ = Ω
SSE
Γ ,703
which proves the theorem.704
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The above theorem demonstrates that it is computationally efficient for705
the Defender to derive her optimal strategy by solving the LP represented706
by (18). It is worth noting that a similar result but for different problem has707
been published in [37].708
6. iRouting709
In this section, we present the iRouting protocol, which stands for intel-710
ligent Routing and whose routing decisions are made according to the Nash711
Delivery Plan (NDP). iRouting has been designed based on the mathemati-712
cal findings of the MDG analysis, presented in previous sections, and its main713
goal is to maximise the utility of the Defender in the presence of a “rational”714
Attacker.715
Within the realm of Mobile Edge Computing (MEC), devices of the clus-716
ter request services from the cluster-head (denoted by C) imposing the need717
for establishing an end-to-end path between the requestor (i.e. destination718
device denoted by Rqs) and C. Each time data must be delivered to Rqs, C719
has to compute the NDP by solving an MDG for this destination. To do this,720
following the route discovery, C uses its latest information about the malware721
detection capabilities of all possible routes to Rqs, along with their inspection722
costs (i.e. malware detection costs to perform, for example, intrusion classi-723
fication). Data is then relayed and collaboratively inspected by the devices724
on its way to Rqs. Overall, the objective of C (i.e. the Defender) is to select725
the route that can correctly detect and filter out malicious data before they726
infect Rqs by making sure that it is not crafted with malware. We assume727
that each device must use its data inspection capabilities at the maximum728
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possible degree..729
iRouting has characteristics of reactive route selection protocols, mean-730
ing that it takes action and starts computing routing paths that have not731
been previously computed when a request for data delivery to Rqs is is-732
sued. iRouting requires to obtain information about the malware inspection733
capabilities and the associated computational cost of devices, in routes from734
C to Rqs.735
Algorithm 1 Seeking routes to destination Rqs.
1: procedure iRouting Request(s, Rqs,Sj)
2: s seeks routes to Rqs by broadcasting RREQRqs;
3: if a device si receives RREQRqs then
4: Sj ∪ {si};
5: if si 6= Rqs then
6: si executes iRouting Request(si, Rqs,Sj);
7: else
8: L← |Sj|, n← 0, Tj ← ∅, Cj ← ∅;
9: iRouting Response(n, L, Tj, Cj,Sj, Rqs);
10: break;
11: end if
12: end if
13: end procedure
iRouting consists of three main phases, which we describe in more detail736
in the remainder of this section. In the first phase of the protocol (described737
in Algorithm 1), C broadcasts a Route REQuest (RREQRqs) to discover routes738
towards Rqs. Each device that receives the RREQRqs), acts similarly by broad-739
casting it towards Rqs. After C sends a RREQRqs, it has to await for some740
timeout Treq, which is set equal to the Net Traversal Time (NetTT), as in741
AODV [7].742
The second phase of the protocol starts when the receiving device is743
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Algorithm 2 Responding to a cluster-head with a route to Rqs.
1: procedure iRouting Response(n, L, Tj, Cj,Sj, s)
2: s sends RREPRqs to the (L− n)-th device of Sj, let it be si;
3: if si 6= C then
4: Tj ∪ p(si), Cj ∪ c(si), n← n+ 1;
5: iRouting Response(n, L, Tj, Cj,Sj, si);
6: else
7: Execute iRouting(Rqs, D,Sj, Tj, Cj);
8: break;
9: end if
10: end procedure
Rqs. Then, this device does not forward the request any further. Instead, it744
prepares a Route REPly (RREPRqs), and sends it back towards C by using745
the reverse route, which is built during the delivery of RREQRqs, as described746
by Algorithm 2. Each RREPRqs carries information about: (i) the set Sj of747
devices that comprise a route; (ii) the set Tj of vectors of “failing-to-detect”748
probabilities, for different malware, of devices in rj; and (iii) the set Cj of com-749
putational malware inspection costs c(si) of devices in rj. These values are750
updated while the RREPRqs is traveling back to C. When each device (e.g. si)751
that is involved in the route response phase, receives the RREPRqs, it updates752
Tj and Cj. Within the time period Treq, C aggregates RREPRqs messages and753
updates its routing table with information that can be used to derive the754
optimal routing strategy, as dictated by Theorem 2.755
In the third phase of the protocol, described in Algorithm 3, C uses its756
routing table to solve the MDG by computing the Nash Delivery Plan, de-757
noted by ρNE, which has a lifetime T . Then, C probabilistically selects a route758
according to ρNE to deliver the requested data to Rqs. The chosen route is759
denoted by r∗. Note that for the same Rqs and before T expires, C uses the760
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Algorithm 3 Delivering data to Rqs.
1: procedure iRouting(Rqs, D,Sj, Tj, Cj)
2: C derives the Nash Delivery Plan, ρNE using Sj, Tj, Cj;
3: C chooses r∗ probabilistically as dictated by ρNE;
4: C delivers D to Rqs over r∗;
5: Each device si ∈ r∗ performs data inspection;
6: if D found to carry malware then
7: si drops D;
8: si notifies C by sending a notification message along the reverse
path;
9: C blacklists the device that sent, through the cloud, D consisting
of malware;
10: else
11: si forwards D to Rqs;
12: end if
13: end procedure
same ρNE to derive r∗, upon a new Request.761
Also, the third phase focuses on detecting malware injected along with762
the requested data (denoted by D) to prevent the infection of Rqs. While763
D is delivered to Rqs over r∗, the relay devices, on r∗, perform data in-764
spection auditing D for malware. Upon successful detection, the device that765
detects the malware, first drops D, and then notifies C that D was crafted766
with malware. The notification message is sent along the reverse path. When767
receiving this, C blacklists the device that has originally sent D (this device768
is assumed that has hijacked the communication link between MEC server769
and the cluster-head). This can be seen as the first step towards mitigating770
the investigated attack model and anything beyond that is out of the scope771
of this paper.772
While each data D is collaboratively inspected by the devices on its way773
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to Rqs, the derivation of the optimal routing strategy, i.e. the Nash Delivery774
Plan (NDP), is computed only by C through solving a Malware Detection775
Game (MDG) for this specific destination Rqs. Therefore, even if the other776
devices are aware of the existence of some infected data, it is only C that777
isolates the Attacker (i.e. data source) towards mitigating future malware778
infection risks.779
The communications complexity of the iRouting protocol measured in780
terms of number of messages exchanged in performing route discovery is781
O(2N), where N is the number of devices in the D2D network. As a reactive782
routing protocol, iRouting has higher storage complexity than conventional783
routing protocols, but it supports multiple-path routing and QoS routing784
making malware detection optimal, as shown in section 5. Finally, iRouting785
has a time complexity equal to O(2D), where D is the diameter of the D2D786
network.787
7. Simulations788
7.1. Network setup789
We have conducted a series of simulations to evaluate the performance790
of the optimal strategies in D2D networks. Devices have been randomly de-791
ployed inside a rectangular area of 1000m x 1000m. For each device, the792
transmission power is fixed, and the maximum transmission range is 200m,793
while two devices can directly communicate with each other only if they are794
in each others transmission range. We have performed the simulations using795
the OMNeT++ network simulator and INET framework. We have simulated796
the IEEE 802.11 MAC layer protocol and devices send UDP traffic. In the797
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Table 3: Simulation parameter values
Parameter Value
Number of nodes 20
Mobility model Linear Mobility
Mobility Speed 10 m/s
Mobility Update Interval 0.1 s
Packet size 512 bytes
Packet generation rate 2 packets/s
Simulation time 600 s
simulations, the requestor of some data is chosen randomly, and the total798
number of devices of a cluster is set to be 20. The total simulation time799
varies (10, 20, 40, 60, 120 seconds) to confirm the consistency of results. Ta-800
ble 3 summarizes the simulation parameters.801
7.2. Security controls and malware802
Simulations consider one adversary who is injecting a sequence of consecu-803
tive malicious replies with the aim to infect Rqs. We assume that the Attacker804
chooses to inject one of [M ] = {Keylogger, SMS spam, Rootkit iSAM, Spy-805
ware, iKee-B, Premium-Rate calls} malware types (i.e. pure strategies of the806
Attacker). We have also assumed the anti-malware controls, SMS Profiler,807
iDMA, iTL, and Touchstroke, along with their detection rates, as published808
in [49]. Each mobile device is equipped with at least one and up to three809
anti-malware controls.810
7.3. Attackers811
We have simulated 3 different Attacker types; namely Uniform, Weighted,812
and Nash Attacker:813
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• Uniform: the Attacker chooses each malware type from the set with814
equal probability. For example for the set we have used here, there is815
a probability 1
6
= 0.1667 the Attacker to choose any of the malware816
types of [M ];817
• Weighted : the Attacker chooses a malware type with probability de-818
rived by the following algorithm:819
1. find the average utility value of the Attacker for each column of820
the game matrix;821
2. add the average utility values of the Attacker for all columns to822
get the combined sum;823
3. for each malware type, derive the probability of a malware type824
to be chosen by dividing its average utility value, found in step 1,825
by the sum derived in step 2.826
• Nash: the Attacker plays according to her Nash strategy µNE.827
Per Reply, the simulator chooses an attack sample from the attack proba-828
bility distribution which is determined by the Attacker profile.829
We have introduced different probability distributions for each Attacker830
type, only for testing purposes. Nevertheless, iRouting is optimal regardless831
of the probability distribution of a malware type to be chosen by the Attacker;832
a petition that is formally consolidated by the mathematical results presented833
in sections 4 and 5 as well as the simulation results uncovered in this section.834
7.4. Experiments835
We have considered 5 Cases each referring to different simulation times:836
10, 20, 40, 60, and 120 mins. For each Case we have simulated 1,000 replies,837
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which are UDP messages of length 512 bytes with delay limit 100 seconds,838
for a fixed network topology. Yet we refer to the run of the code for the pair839
〈Case,#replies〉 by the term Experiment. We have repeated each Experiment840
for 10 independent network topologies to get a clear idea of the results’841
trend. We do that for all 5 Cases and each type of Attacker profile. Thus842
we simulate, in total: 5 Cases × 1, 000 replies × 10 network topologies =843
50, 000 replies.844
7.5. Comparisons845
We compare iRouting against AODV, DSR, and custom-made routing846
protocol called Proportional Routing (PR), for different Attacker types.847
PR is computed as follows. First, by using the game matrix, the Defender848
computes the average utility value for each row, let it be849
Uˆd(rj) =
∑M
ml=1
Ud(rj,ml)
M
, ∀ rj ∈ [R]. (29)
Then, the probability of route rj to be chosen equals:850
1− Uˆd(rj)∑R
r=1 Uˆd(r)
. (30)
According to the results illustrated in Figures 2 - 4, iRouting consistently851
outperforms the rest of the protocols, in terms of both Defender’s expected852
utility and average detection rate, for all different simulation times and At-853
tacker types. The results show that iRouting achieves its highest average854
malware detection rate (∼65%) against a Uniform Attacker (non-strategic855
Attacker), and its worst rate against a Weighted Attacker. In the case of a856
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Nash Attacker, iRouting has almost 22% higher detection rate than PR, 6%857
than DSR, while it is twice more efficient (i.e. ∼11%) than AODV. For a858
Weighted Attacker, PR behaves differently as it achieves approximately 6%859
lower average detection rate than iRouting, in contrast to DSR and AODV,860
which perform worse, as opposed to the Nash Attacker case, since the differ-861
ence of their average detection rate compared to iRouting becomes double862
(i.e.∼12% for DSR and 24% for AODV). Finally, for a Uniform Attacker, the863
difference, in terms of detection rate, compared to iRouting, is almost the864
same for both DSR and PR, which is approximately equivalent to 8%. AODV865
still has the worst average detection rate among all protocols by having 24%866
worse rate than iRouting.867
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Figure 2: Malware detection rate in presence of a Nash attacker.
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Figure 3: Malware detection rate in presence of a Uniform attacker.
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Figure 4: Malware detection rate in presence of a Weighted attacker.
According to Figures 5 - 7, iRouting achieves the best performance in868
terms of average expected utility among all protocols. More specifically,869
iRouting improves the average expected utility, in the case of a Nash At-870
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tacker, by, in average, 49%, 17%, and 7% compared to PR, AODV, and871
DSR, respectively. We notice that the Defender’s utility in iRouting is sim-872
ilar to the one achieved when DSR is used. The reason for this is that DSR873
improves computational cost as opposed to iRouting more than AODV and874
PR while exhibiting the best detection rate among AODV and PR. Average875
improvement values are slightly more pronounced for a non-strategic Uni-876
form Attacker; 16%, 68%, and 37%, as opposed to the same protocols. The877
situation is similar for a Weighted Attacker, in which case the corresponding878
improvement values are 18%, 53%, and 20%. We also notice that the be-879
haviour of all protocols but iRouting is stochastic despite of iRouting having880
steadily the best performance.881
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Figure 5: Utility of the Defender in presence of a Nash attacker.
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Figure 6: Utility of the Defender in presence of a Uniform attacker.
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Figure 7: Utility of the Defender in presence of a Weighted attacker.
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8. Conclusion882
In this paper, we have formally investigated how to select an end-to-883
end path to deliver data from a source to a destination in device-to-device884
networks under a game theoretic framework. We assume the presence of an885
external adversary who aims to infect “good” network devices with mal-886
ware. First, a simple yet illuminating two-player security game, between the887
network (the Defender) and an adversary, is studied. To devise optimal rout-888
ing strategies, optimality analysis has been undertaken for different types of889
games to prove, in theory, that there is a Nash equilibrium strategy that890
always makes the Defender better-off. The analysis has shown that the ex-891
pected security damage that can be inflicted by the Attacker is bounded and892
limited when the proposed strategy is used by the Defender. Network sim-893
ulation results have also illustrated, in practice, that the proposed strategy894
can effectively mitigate malware infection. In future work, we intend to inves-895
tigate machine learning algorithms (e.g. boosting) to convert weak learners896
(e.g. devices with limited number of anti-malware controls) to strong ones.897
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